Introduction
In most cases, trade liberalization is welfare increasing but it also brings about large income redistributions. Simulation models calibrated on real world data show that the aggregate gains for a country eliminating its tariffs are typically a few percentage points of its initial GDP. Similarly, gains from multilateral trade policy reforms for the whole world tend to be small. Conversely, losses suffered by specific, initially protected, sectors or factors can be much larger. As Rodrik (1998) puts it: "the [static] efficiency consequences of trade reform pale in comparison to its redistributive effects". These effects often create complicated policy challenges both at the domestic and international levels. This is because, in most cases, losers tend to be a smaller and more vocal group than winners.
1 Perhaps the most recent and glaring example of this trade-related distributional tensions is the impasse of the Doha Round. Disputes over the reduction of agriculture markets distortions have stalled the whole multilateral trade negotiations. The controversy is centered on the demands of developing and agriculture exporting countries for the phasing out of export subsidies and massive domestic supports that are mainly implemented in developed nations.
What is most interesting in this example is how a between countries distributional tension may actually generate enough pressure to push not only for the elimination of direct trade distortions, such as export subsidies and tariffs, but also for the removal of domestic policy measures, such as support for agriculture. Although multilateral trade negotiations have been delayed in the past, never before the 2003 Cancún WTO Ministerial meeting the dissent between developing and high income countries had been so clear. 2 Resolving this international dispute may improve the distribution of income between countries and may also narrow income disparities within national economies. This is because the proposed reforms imply that, in a typical highly protected developed country, inefficiencies created by the large transfers between tax payers and farmers 1 According to Anderson and Martin (2005) , self-interested vocal groups lobbying hard for excluding agricultural liberalization from multilateral negotiations include "not just farmers in the highly protecting countries and net food importing developing countries but also those food exporters receiving preferential access to those markets including holders of tariff rate quotas, members of regional trading agreements, and parties to non-reciprocal preference agreements including all least-developed countries." 2 In 2003 during the Cancún WTO Ministerial meeting, a group of developing countries, the Group-ofTwenty, was formed and soon became a relevant negotiating group. Key members include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand and South Africa.
would be reduced. And in many developing countries, policies tending to privilege urban dwellers by protecting their industries and maintaining low prices for food items to the disadvantage of usually poorer local farmers 3 would also be eliminated or at least restrained. Besides, given that poverty incidence is highest among farmers, the poverty reduction potential of agriculture trade liberalization looks quite promising. This paper, using an ex-ante simulation analysis, assesses the likelihood of these claims: a) how much global inequality is reduced in a situation where all agriculture trade distortions are removed? b) How much this reduction is due to changes of inequality between countries and within countries? c) What happens to global poverty and to poverty incidence in specific countries?
The empirical results of this paper are produced with the World Bank's LINKAGE global general equilibrium model and the newly developed Global Income Distribution Dynamics (GIDD) tool. GIDD is a framework for ex-ante analyses of the distribution and poverty effects of changes in macroeconomic policy and/or trends in global markets. It complements a global CGE analysis with global micro-simulations based on standardized household surveys. The tool pools most of the currently available household surveys covering 1.2 million households in 73 developing countries; household information from developed countries completes the dataset; overall the GIDD sample covers more than 90 percent of the world population.
With the elimination of all agriculture trade distortion, poverty -measured at the 1 dollar a day international poverty line -is reduced in all regions but in the Middle East and North Africa, where it is almost stable, and in South Asia where it increases considerably. This result needs to be qualified though: given that about 50 percent of all poor people live in South Asia the worsening of poverty in this region counterbalances all the gains in the other parts of the world and close to an additional 9 millions people fall into poverty. The situation is rather different at the higher poverty line of 2 dollars a day. In this case 14 million people escape poverty and most regions benefit from lower poverty incidence with the exclusion of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Middle East and North Africa. Many non-agriculture households in South Asia are clustered below the 2 dollar a day poverty line and trade reform-related improvement in their incomes, versus the agricultural incomes' decline, explain the difference in global poverty results when the 1 dollar or the 2 dollar a day lines are used.
Although per capita income gaps between the agriculture-dependent households and the other households are marginally reduced by the removal of trade barriers, global inequality does not change. This is because the lower between agriculture and nonagriculture groups inequality is offset by a higher within group inequality which mainly originates by a widening of incomes within the agriculture sector.
Within country inequality varies within a wide interval ranging from increases of up to 3 Gini points to reduction of 2 Gini points. The majority of countries, around 60% of those included in the sample, experiences an increase of inequality. Most of the distributional change is due to changes of the average incomes between the agriculture and non-agriculture group of households, a direct consequence of the trade shock.
In summary, allocative efficiency gains combined with distributional shifts originating from the removal of agriculture trade restrictions are not enough to significantly alleviate poverty at the 1 dollar a day threshold nor at a higher poverty line. The pattern of global incomes change triggered by such trade reform, as simulated by the model used in this paper, is complex and cannot be simplistically reduced to being equivalent to a boost in growth rates of agriculture. The latter remains an essential component in the strategy for poverty eradication and trade liberalization can only play a constructive but somewhat limited role.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the GIDD datasets and the main features of the initial global income distribution. This descriptive analysis sets the stage for the following sections which illustrate the modeling methodology and the main results. Some final remarks conclude the paper.
What is at stake? The initial position of farmers and the potential benefits or cost of agricultural distortions
Almost 45 percent of the population in the world lives in households where agricultural activities represent the main occupation of the head. And a large share of this agriculture-dependent group, close to 32 percent, is poor. Agriculture households contribute disproportionably to global poverty: three out of every four poor people belong to this group (see Table 1 ). So changing economic opportunities in agriculture can significantly affect global poverty and inequality. The specific opportunity considered in detail here is the removal of agricultural trade barriers. Direct effects of this liberalization will be changes in the international prices of agricultural products and in the returns of factors used intensively in agriculture with these changes determining winners and losers. Before considering these effects in detail, this section describes what is at stake by considering the socio-economic characteristics of the agricultural population. This initial descriptive analysis is based on the GIDD dataset that has been recently developed at the World Bank. The GIDD dataset consists of 73 detailed household surveys for low and middle income countries, complemented with more aggregate information on income distribution for 25 high income and 22 developing countries. 4 Together, data on these 120 countries covers more than 90 percent of the global population. Country coverage varies by region: while the GIDD dataset includes more than 97 percent of population in East Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, and South Asia, coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East and North Africa is limited to 76 and 58 percent of population, respectively. Among the detailed surveys, the majority (54) use per capita consumption as the welfare indicator, while the remaining surveys-all but one for countries in Latin America-include only per capita income as a measure of household welfare. Both income and consumption data are monthly; the data are standardized to the year 2000 and are expressed in 1993 PPP prices for consistency with the 1 and 2 dollar a day poverty lines, which are calculated at 1993 PPP exchange rates.
5
Three facts about the agricultural sector determine the welfare effects of a globalscale removal of agricultural distortions: (1) the proportion of the world population whose real incomes depend on the agricultural sector; (2) the initial position of the agricultural population in the global income distribution; and (3) the dispersion of incomes among the agricultural population. (1993 PPP, log) Using the GIDD dataset, Figure 1 shows a kernel density for the global income distribution of household per capita income/consumption and kernel densities for incomes/consumption of the population in and out of the agricultural sector, respectively. 6 The area below the kernel density for the agricultural sector is equal to 5 The adjustment procedure for expressing welfare indicators in 1993 international dollars (PPP) is as follows. First, for countries with a survey year different than 2000, the welfare indicator (household per capita income or consumption) is scaled to the year 2000 using the cumulative growth in real income per capita between the survey year and 2000. Then, the welfare indicator is converted to 1993 national prices by multiplying the welfare indicator by the ratio of CPI in 1993 to the CPI in the survey year. Finally, the welfare indicator is converted to 1993 international prices by multiplying the outcome of the previous calculations by the 1993 PPP exchange rate. 6 The distributions for the agricultural and non-agricultural populations are not, strictly speaking, density functions since the area below the curve do not add to 1. The densities of the agricultural and nonagricultural population had been rescaled so that the area under the curve represents the proportion of the world population within these two groups. Income inequality can be estimated from the global income distribution data depicted in Figure 1 . The Gini index for the world is equal to 67 %, which denotes a high level of inequality. In fact, the global Gini is about 28 points worse than that of the U.S. and even higher than the level observed in extremely unequal countries such as Mexico. As Bourguignon et al, (2004) noted: "if the world were a country, it would be among the most unequal countries of the world." How much of this inequality can be explained by the disparity on average incomes between the agricultural group and the rest? Inequality decomposition analysis shows that a quarter of global income disparities can be explained by the difference in average incomes between the two groups of households, the remaining three quarters are due to within group income variation.
Based on the pre-established poverty line of 1 dollar (PPP) per day, the GIDD global income data also provide information about the differences in poverty incidence among the two population subgroups. Despite the fact that incomes are better distributed among the agricultural population (the Gini coefficient is 18 points lower in agriculture), lower average incomes in this sector result in higher poverty incidence: 31.7 percent of agricultural households are poor versus 8.1 percent among the non-agricultural households. In terms of personal characteristics of the poor in and out of the agricultural sector, Table 2 shows that no noticeable differences are observed on the average age of the head and household size. However, poor people in agriculture tend to have lower education levels: just below a third of them has completed primary education. In agriculture, poor households headed by a woman are a small minority, close to 8 percent, significantly below the 14 percent observed in the non-agriculture segment (see Table 2 ).
Up to this point the welfare information on agricultural and non-agricultural populations has been derived by agglomerating all households within these two groups irrespectively of their nationality. In fact, the kernel densities in Figure 1 exploit full income heterogeneity across households including variations between and within countries. Countries display large differences in terms of their population size, their level of development and the importance of the agricultural sector in their economies. These three country-specific characteristics are important determinants of the change of global poverty and global inequality. Clearly, as shown by Figure 2 , global poverty would be strongly reduced in cases where China and India move towards higher income levels. Given their initial large share of global population and their position in the global income distribution, the economic expansion of these two giants is a key factor shaping the evolution of the world economy.
7 Figure 2 also depicts a negative relationship between income levels and share of workers in agriculture, and although this relationship is imperfectly inferred from a cross section of countries at a particular point in time, it still suggests that profound structural shifts will likely affect income distribution within countries. Clearly, the development challenges of a transition from an agriculture-based economy towards a more industrialized one, or even the management of the shocks originating from (agriculture) trade policy reform differ enormously across countries. Figure 3 , complementing the previous one, shows this heterogeneity by displaying, for each county in our sample, the proportion of agricultural population and its corresponding share of total income. Given the large variation in the proportion of the population whose incomes depend on the agricultural sector, the income effects following a removal of agricultural distortions would be highly different between countries. Little income effects are expected in countries like Hungary or Mexico where the proportion of population working in the agricultural sector is very small. Conversely, larger impacts can be anticipated in Nepal and Burundi where the agricultural population accounts for more than 80 percent of the total population. Confirming the negative relationship between agriculture specialization and income levels, Figure 3 shows that the large majority of countries with a share of the agriculture population group above 50 percent -the agriculture-based countries -are located in the poorest region of the world: Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 25 countries of the agriculture-based group, 12 are SubSaharan, 4 are from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 3 from both East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia, and only 2 and 1 from Latin America and the Caribbean and Middle East and North Africa, respectively.
The pattern observed at the global level, namely that agriculture-dependent households on average earn less than other households, is replicated for all developing countries in the GIDD (Figure 3 ): the share of total population employed in agriculture activities is always larger than its corresponding share of total income. The simple average income premium, i.e. the ratio of non-agricultural to agricultural incomes, is equal to 2.25. Clearly this premium is unconditional in the sense that it does not take into account that in agriculture low-earning unskilled workers tend to be more abundant than skilled workers, or that other factors may explain the observed income gap. However, a simple multivariate regression analysis shows that even controlling for education, age, gender, household size, geographic region, and country fixed-effects, agriculture-related incomes are still 23 percent lower than incomes derived from other sectors. Note: authors calculations based on GIDD dataset using developing countries information only.
An important element hidden in Figure 1 and only partially shown in Figure 3 is the degree of cross-country variation in income inequality. Figure 4 shows that the difference in the Gini coefficient between countries is enormous, with former communist countries like Romania and Hungary showing an index below 0.3 whereas in highly unequal countries such as South Africa and Mozambique the index reaches values above 0.6. Once again, the tendency of higher inequality within the agriculture group observed at the global level is corroborated by the analysis of country-specific inequality. For more than three quarters of the countries included in our data (56 out of 73), Gini indicators of inequality within the agricultural group are higher than those of the non-agricultural group (Figure 4 ). 
Gini in agriculture (-) Gini in non-agriculture (x)
Overall Gini (♦ )
Note: authors calculations based on GIDD dataset using developing countries information only.
A global trade reform removing agricultural distortions is expected to reallocate resources between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors at the international level and within national states. Given global variations in: (a) the importance of the agricultural sector, (b) the agriculture to non-agriculture income premia, and (c) the within-sector income inequality, the resource reallocation following trade reform will have significant distributional effects between and within countries. Can economic theory provide some guidance on the expected global welfare effects following the removal of agricultural distortions?
According to Winters (2000) , McCulloch et al. (2001) and Hoekman et al. (2002) , trade liberalization and household welfare are linked via prices, factor markets, and consumer preferences. International prices of agricultural products will, most likely, increase as a result of the removal of agricultural trade barriers such as subsidies and tariffs (Anderson, 2003) . Assuming some degree of pass-through, the increase in international prices will be followed by a rise in domestic agricultural prices enhancing a redistribution of resources from non-agricultural to the agricultural sector of the economy. Based on Figure 1 , such redistribution could help reduce global poverty and inequality. However, household consumption patterns will also change as a result of the shift in prices, making the link between agricultural trade liberalization and global household welfare a complex one. As a consequence of the agricultural reform, redistribution of real income will take place between net producers and net consumers of agricultural products, with the welfare of the former improving at the expense of the latter.
8 Finally, factor prices will also change after trade liberalization, changing real incomes of households that are not directly involved in agricultural production.
The transition from trade theory to real world analysis presents serious challenges. A sound empirical strategy has to estimate the effects of the reform on: prices, monetary incomes (via profits in the case of farm households and returns to factors of production for non-farm households), consumption, and transfers. 9 The framework used in this paper, and described in more details below, accounts for the impact of agricultural trade liberalization through some of these channels.
Methodology
The empirical analysis in this paper relies on the GIDD, a newly developed tool for analyzing Global Income Distribution Dynamics. 10 The GIDD, developed at the Development Economic Prospects Group of the World Bank, combines a consistent set of price and volume changes from a global CGE model with micro data at the household level to create a hypothetical or counterfactual income distribution capturing the welfare effects of the policy under evaluation.
11 Therefore, the GIDD has the ability to map CGEconsistent macroeconomic outcomes to disaggregated household survey data.
The GIDD's framework is based on micro-simulation methodologies developed in the recent literature, including Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva (2003); Leite (2003, 2004) ; Chen and Ravallion (2003); and Bussolo, Lay, and van der Mensbrugghe (2005) . The starting point is the global income distribution in 2000, assembled using data from household surveys (see above). 12 The hypothetical distribution is then obtained by applying three main exogenous changes to the initial distribution: (a) shifts in the sectoral composition of employment; (b) economic growth, including changes in relative wages across skills and sectors; and (c) changes in real income estimated from changes in nominal incomes and prices of consumption baskets.
The starting point is simulating the removal of agricultural distortions with the global CGE model and estimating the new equilibrium in terms of new commodity and factor's prices and quantities. From these it is then possible to calculate the variables linking the macro and micro levels of the model: labor allocation among agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, wage premiums among agricultural/non-agricultural and skilled/unskilled groups, and the overall real effect corresponding to the change in real consumption per capita. The current version of the model does not consider the first link variable: labor reallocation. This is equivalent to consider a case where individuals are not able to switch employment or, in other words, it considers just short term effects. The mentioned CGE results are passed-on to the household survey data, creating a new, hypothetical household income distribution.
13 Distribution and poverty comparisons between the initial and the counterfactual income distributions capture the welfare effects of the removal of global agricultural distortions.
In the real world the changes just described take place simultaneously, but in the GIDD's simplified framework they are accommodated in a sequential fashion. The sequential changes reshape national income distribution under a set of strong assumptions. In particular, income inequality within population subgroups formed by skills and sector of employment is assumed to remain constant after the trade reform. Moreover, data limitations affect estimates of the initial inequality and its evolution. Although consumption expenditure is a more reliable welfare measure than income, and its distribution is normally more equal than the distribution of income, consumption data are not available for all countries' surveys. To get a global picture, the present study had to include, both, countries for which only income data were available with countries with consumption information. Finally, measurement errors implicit in purchasing power parity exchange rates, which have been used to convert local currency units, also affect comparability across countries. The resulting hypothetical income distribution should thus not be seen as a forecast of what the future distribution might look like; instead it should be interpreted as the result of an exercise that captures the ceteris paribus distributional effect of agricultural trade liberalization.
What happens to poverty and income distribution when agriculture trade distortions are removed?
In this section, we link the macro outcomes of global agricultural trade reform to the changes in the distribution of income between and within countries. Our analysis is carried out in three stages. First, we briefly examine the macroeconomic results of the LINKAGE model, focusing on the variables that are passed on to the household survey data. Second, we consider the income distribution results from a global perspective, quantifying the likely changes in global poverty and inequality and identifying groups of countries and individuals that are likely to benefit the most (least) from agricultural trade reform. Thirdly, we assess the potential trends in the distribution of income within countries, identifying countries where inequality pressures may heighten and thus erode support for additional reforms.
Macroeconomic general equilibrium results
The LINKAGE simulation analysis has been carried out with the 7.0 pre-release of the GTAP database, which disaggregates global trade into bilateral flows between 101 countries/regions in 57 commodity groups. The base year for the simulations is 2004, and the data take into account changes in the global trade and tariff structure due to the implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments, the EU enlargement, China's accession to the WTO, and implementation of most major preferential trade agreements. The model is solved in a comparative static mode, which means that simulations are implemented as one-time shocks and do not take into account potential growth effects through changes in capital accumulation rates or variations in productivity.
Our main simulation envisions the full removal of import tariffs and export taxes/subsidies on agriculture and food products around the globe. The liberalization schedule includes 17 out of 57 commodities in GTAP, and the initial level of protection by exporter is shown in Table 3. 14 We also consider an alternative scenario where all border distortions are removed and use it as a second reference point in our analysis; in other words, we are interested not only in the pattern of changes in the global economy following the removal of agricultural distortions, but also how this pattern compares with the adjustments likely to take place if all trade were liberalized.
Due to the removal of barriers to trade in agriculture and food products, global consumption rises by 0.29 percent, two-thirds of the improvement expected under a full trade liberalization scenario. Low and middle income countries gain more than the average, with consumption rising by 0.47 percent in the developing world compared to 0.24 percent for high-income countries. 50 out of 60 LINKAGE country/regionsrepresenting nearly 95 percent of the world-experience positive changes in consumption following the removal of agricultural distortions, compared to 47 country/regions that are likely to experience consumption gains under global trade reform ( Figure 5 ). 17.6 1.6 82.4 Note: "Tariffs faced" column shows the import-weighted average tariff imposed by the column country/region on exports from the row country/region. "Exports" column shows the exports of the row country/region to the column country/region as a share of the former's total exports. Source: Authors' calculations with GTAP7.0 database There are three main channels that transmit the trade reform shocks to household consumption in the LINKAGE model and help explain the heterogeneity of the results in Figure 5 . The first channel is the changes in the terms of trade, the ratio of export prices to import prices without taking into account domestic price distortions (i.e., own import tariffs and export taxes/subsidies). Net exporters of agriculture and food, such as Brazil, Ecuador, and New Zealand, reap significant welfare gains when the world export prices of these commodities rise by 8, 19, and 11 percent, respectively. 15 On the other hand, net importers of food, such as China, Mexico, and Senegal, experience real consumption losses due to higher import prices. The second channel is tightly linked to the first, and has to do with the impact of countries' own policies. Thus, countries with high prereform tariffs or export taxes, such as Lithuania, Nigeria, and North Africa, tend to experience larger consumption gains than countries where the initial distortions are low.
If the initial trade barriers are sufficiently high, consumers may face lower post-reform prices of food even if import prices are rising; this is the case of North Africa, which experiences an increase in real consumption despite being a net food importer. The third channel is the impact of trade reform on government budgets. Since the model does not include an explicit transversality condition, we maintain a fixed budget deficit closure, which means that any losses in public revenue (such as a reduction in tariff income) must be offset by a compensatory increase in the direct tax rate on the households. 16 Therefore, welfare gains are limited in countries such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe, which rely on taxes on international trade as an important component of public revenue.
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In addition to changes in levels of per capita consumption across countries, the LINKAGE results hint at important distributional consequences of trade reform within countries through changes in returns to labor in different sectors and at varying skill levels. Figure 6 shows the contributions of payments to different factors to the total change in real GDP at factor cost (in percentage points) following the removal of agricultural trade distortions. With the exception of China, all countries experiencing an increase in payments to unskilled labor in agriculture also register consumption gains due to trade reform, but the converse does not hold. Real consumption increases in 32 out of 41 countries that show a decline in unskilled agriculture wages; since unskilled workers in agriculture tend to be the poorest part of the population, these results suggest that pressures towards increased inequality may be intensifying in many regions in the world.
18 Furthermore, the losses and gains in agriculture wages exhibit strong regional patterns: real wages of unskilled farmers rise in Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia & Pacific, while declining in other developing regions, and, much more strongly, in high income countries.
The initial level of protection in agriculture (excluding processed food), combined with the terms of trade shock, represent the main determinants of the trends in farm factor prices. Consider the example of India, where unskilled farm wages decline by 6.1 percent following trade reform.
19 Indian farmers must contend with falling international prices of imported agriculture products (a decline of 1.7 percent) as well as a loss of tariff protection (2.0 percent), export subsidies (3.3 percent), and output subsidies (6.9 percent). The first two channels decrease the farmers' competitiveness on the domestic market and lead to higher import penetration, while the third channel erodes their competitiveness on the international markets. The fourth channel increases production costs and makes Indian farmers less competitive overall. Together, these effects create strong incentives for farmers to exit the agriculture sector and result in lower farm labor earnings. 16 In other words, this closure choice gives rise to consistent measurement of household utility as the utility function does not include the consumption of public goods. 17 In this situation, the ability of households to gain or lose from trade reform depends on (in addition to the impacts of the first two channels) their ability to substitute out of more expensive goods into cheaper alternatives. 18 Note that trends in consumption per capita are unlikely to be representative of the welfare of agricultural households, since their weight in total consumption is low due to limited incomes and high incidence of poverty. 19 The 6 percent figure refers to increase in the nominal wages. The change in real wages depends on the choice of deflator: while the CPI increases by 2 percent relative to the base year, the GDP deflator falls by 1 percent.
In Mexico, the income losses among unskilled farmers are lower than in India. This is partially attributable to its close trading relationship with the US. Mexico purchases 75 percent of its agriculture imports from the US, whose export prices rise by 5.7 percent due to the elimination of export and production subsidies. Thus, the removal of agriculture price support in the US puts upward pressure on import prices of agriculture in Mexico, which hurts consumers but increases the competitiveness of farmers on the domestic market. On the other hand, this trend is counteracted by the removal of tariff protection on agriculture (1.2 percent) and output subsidies (0.8 percent), which lead to a decrease in competitiveness of agriculture producers in Mexico and market share losses in both domestic and export markets.
Brazil, on the other hand, is an example of a country where a number of positive developments combine to produce a nearly 34 percent gain in the wages of unskilled agriculture workers. 20 The import prices of agriculture in Brazil rise by 1.8 percent, bolstering the domestic competitiveness of its farmers, while export prices increase by more than 10 percent. Because Brazilian farmers do not receive any export or production subsidies, they are well-positioned to take advantage of these opportunities and gain market share both domestically and abroad. Although some of the gains to agriculture producers are offset by the loss in domestic protection (import tariff of 2.4 percent), Brazilian agriculture is still able to increase its production volume by 17.8 percent following trade reform. Note: The black bars show the percent increase in consumption (at pre-reform prices) due to the removal of trade distortions in agriculture and food products (excluding beverages and tobacco). The grey bars show the additional gains in consumption due to the removal of all remaining trade barriers. The combined length of the two bars shows the consumption gains from a full global trade reform.
Figure 5 Most countries gain from the removal of agricultural distortions
Source: Authors' simulations with the LINKAGE model. Note: Each bar shows a contribution of changes in value added of a specific factor to the total change in value added, deflated by the price of GDP at factor cost. Countries are sorted (in descending order) by the increase in payments to unskilled farm labor.
Figure 6 In the majority of countries, unskilled wages in agriculture decline
Source: Authors' simulations with the LINKAGE model.
Micro-simulation results: Global Poverty and Inequality
In this section, we use the GIDD model and data to simulate the likely changes in global poverty and inequality due to the elimination of all agricultural trade distortions. Given the richness of the data and the numerous factors affecting global poverty and inequality within the GIDD, this section starts with two simulations that illustrate, in a simple way, the expected effects of a global agricultural trade reform. Focusing only on low and middle income countries in our data, both simulations raise the average income in the developing world by 1 percent. In the first instance, this occurs due to an increase in incomes of agricultural households only, while in the second exercise, the increase is due entirely to an expansion in non-agricultural incomes. The results of these examples are shown with two growth incidence curves (GIC) 21 in Figure 7 . The thin GIC captures the effects of assigning income gains only to agricultural households, while the thick GIC raises incomes only for those households whose head works in non-agricultural activities. As expected, the increase in agricultural incomes is more pro-poor than the same income change taking place in other sectors where households are relatively richer. This pro-poor bias of growth in agricultural incomes is reflected in the downward slope of the thin GIC, with the poorest households reaping the largest income gains. A different way of interpreting the results of Figure 7 is to observe that, if agricultural sectors in all 21 The GIC is shows the changes in welfare along the entire income distribution, therefore capturing, in a single graph, the growth and distributional components of overall welfare changes. For a detailed description of the properties characterizing the growth incidence curves see Ravallion and Chen (2003) .
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developing countries receive income gains above those of the non-agriculture sectors as a result of the elimination of agricultural distortions, global poverty and inequality would fall. Although, as shown in the discussion below, the reality tends to be much more complex than the simple simulations above, the central message of Figure 7 captures the essence of the GIDD simulations. Are we really capturing the essence of the following simulations? In the simulations global poverty is actually increasing!!
Poverty and Inequality Impacts: A Global View
Translating the shocks from the LINKAGE model into poverty and inequality outcomes with the GIDD shows that the effects of a full removal of agricultural trade distortions on global poverty are close to zero. This limited impact is explained by several factors. First, the growth effects of the reform (i.e., changes in per capita consumption) are very small.
According to the GIDD, the world's average monthly household income increases 0.3 percent after the removal of agricultural distortions, passing from an initial level of $207 to a final value of $208, 1993 PPP (see Table 4 ). Second, the reform has little impact on inequality at the global level. Although incomes rise in the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors alike, agricultural incomes increase by a little more than 1 percent whilst incomes in non-agricultural activities rise at the much lower rate of 0.2 percent. While this reduction in the non-agricultural income premium reduces inequality, Table 4 shows that income dispersion within the agricultural sector is also increasing, with the final change in global income distribution being close to zero. The distributional changes taking place within the agricultural sector are such that the incidence of extreme poverty (under 1 dollar a day, PPP) in this sector rises by almost 1 percentage point as a consequence of the elimination of agricultural trade distortions. On the other hand, poverty among non-agricultural households experienced a reduction equal to 0.36 percentage points. The combination of poverty changes occurring in and out of the agricultural sector ends up increasing global poverty by 0.4 percentage points, or 21 million additional individuals below the extreme poverty line. This result should be taken with caution since the poverty effect of the agricultural trade reform depends on where the poverty line is set. While global poverty measured by the 1 dollar a day poverty line shows a moderate increase of 0.18 percentage points as a consequence of the reform, when measured at 2 dollars a day, poverty reduces by 0.3 percentage points. The results presented so far have treated the world as a single entity, making no distinction between regions or countries. Thus, lack of major changes at the global level could be the outcome of offsetting trends between regions. As discussed in Section 4.1, farmers in Latin America (LAC) are big winners from trade reform with an impressive increase of 16 percent in their household income. By contrast, incomes of farmers in South Asia (SA) shrink more than 3 percent after agricultural distortions are dismantled. In order to show the incidence of these changes among the population in the different regions, Figure 8 plots the GIC for Latin America, South Asia and the rest of the world. The GIC for Latin America shows that the agriculture-based growth in the region is highly pro-poor; on the contrary, South Asia's reduction in agricultural incomes is highly regressive, with the poorest households losing from the reform. East Asia and, to a lesser extent, Sub-Saharan Africa benefit from the global reform, while the effects of the reform are progressive, albeit close to zero, for the rest of the world. The differences in reform outcomes across regions help explain the global results. With half a billion people in extreme poverty, South Asia alone accounts for almost half of global poverty; on the other hand, Latin America contributes less than 5 percent to global poverty (see Table 5 ). Hence, although removing agricultural distortions alleviates extreme poverty in many regions in the world, the increase in South Asia's head count ratio offsets these gains and drags an extra 9 million people below the poverty line. The results using the 2 dollars per day poverty line show a very different picture. Poverty is alleviated in all regions except for Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. 22 The results at the moderate poverty line are particularly interesting for South Asia, where agricultural trade reform becomes pro-poor instead of anti-poor as it was the case when using the 1 dollar-a-day PPP poverty line. This result is explained by the large number of non-agricultural households that are below the moderate poverty line in South Asia. South Asian households working in non-agricultural activities experience an increase in real incomes after the agricultural markets are liberalized and therefore contribute to reduction in moderate poverty in the region. 22 Due to space restriction, the results using the 2 dollars a day poverty line are included in an Appendix.
Latin America
Rest of the World South Asia % of Poor in SAS % of Poor in LAC Notes: (1) Number of poor expressed in thousands. (2) The simulations are based on the GIDD's results.
Zooming in: Poverty and Inequality Effects Between and Within Countries
Global agricultural liberalization has distributional and poverty effects that vary not only across regions but also between and within countries. This section summarizes the poverty effects for each of the countries included in our sample and the distributional changes taking place within them. Table 5 shows that the extra 9 million individuals under poverty is a combination of a 14.8 million increase in poverty and a 5.8 million decrease in poverty. Figure 9 shows the countries that contribute the most to this reduction and increase in global poverty, respectively. Among the new poor, 78.2 percent-almost 13 million-are Indian nationals, while 6.2 percent are located in Bangladesh, and 4.2 percent are Ethiopians. Although the increase in poverty is mainly an Indian phenomenon, all 5 South Asian countries contribute significantly to the global increase in poverty. On the other hand, the gross reduction in global poverty is distributed more evenly among the winning countries with the great majority of them being located in Latin America and East Asia and the Pacific (EAP). In fact, no country in EAP and only Chile and Mexico in LAC experience an increase in the number of extreme poor as a result of agricultural trade reform.
The contributions to the global entry and exit of poverty depicted in Figure 9 are, to a certain extent, the outcomes of differences in population size. For instance, a very populous country such as India can have a substantial contribution to global poverty without necessarily implying a large increase in the country's head count ratio. Another way of ranking countries in terms of their poverty outcomes is to consider the postreform change in the head count ratio. Undertaking this exercise shows that, among countries where poverty falls, the head count ratio in the Philippines and Ecuador decreases by 1.8 percentage points, just below the fall registered in Yemen, Peru and Paraguay (1.5). With an increase of 1.3 percentage points in the head count ratio, India is still the country with the largest increase in poverty. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, poverty in India falls by 0.3 percentage points if changes are evaluated at the 2 dollars a day poverty line. Interestingly, these changes in the head count ratio in India occur while average household income remains constant, and are therefore entirely a result of a deterioration in income distribution. Our results show that the significant increase in poverty in India is entirely explained by a post-reform increase in inequality of almost 1 Gini point. Three quarters of this increase is attributable to a rise in the agricultural-to-non-agricultural income gap in India. On the other hand, poverty reduction in Brazil is the outcome of a combination of a 1 percent increase in average income and a reduction in inequality of a little more than half a Gini point. The changes in overall growth and distribution taking place in India and Brazil are summarized by the GIC for these two countries plotted in Figure 10 . Given the importance of Brazil and India in their respective regions, it is not surprising that the shape of the GIC for these countries are very similar to the region's GICs plotted in Figure 8 . Figure 10 shows that the only beneficiaries of agricultural liberalization in India are those in the top 22 percent of the distribution; given than 83 percent of the Indian population is below the 2 dollars a day poverty line, part of the top 22 percent is formed by household under moderate poverty. For most countries in our sample, removing agricultural distortions does not have large distributional effects. In more than half of the countries, the Gini coefficient shows a change of less than half a Gini point. This pattern is also observed in the changes in the country-specific Theil index plotted in Figure 11 . There are distinguishable regional differences in the distributional effects of the reform, with countries in Latin America and East Asia experiencing a considerable reduction in income inequality whilst inequality in countries outside these regions remains constant or rises marginally. The advantage of using the Theil index as the inequality measure is that we can decompose its change into an effect attributable to shifts in the agricultural to non-agricultural wage gap (between effect) and the effects due to income changes within these two groups. Figure 11 shows the total changes in the Theil index (depicted by a star) and the changes attributable to movements in the non-agricultural income premium (little horizontal bar). Since the "between" effect is very close to the total distributional effect for the majority of countries, we can conclude that the total change in income distribution in these economies is mainly the outcome of changes in mean incomes of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. 
Conclusions and policy messages
Trade distortions in agriculture and food represent the last major bastion of protection and have proven to be the main point of contention in recent multilateral trade negotiations. Using a newly developed dataset and methodological approach for evaluating the poverty and inequality effects of policy reforms-the GIDD-this paper has evaluated the potential impacts of the removal of agriculture trade distortions on the global income distribution. There are three main messages emerging from our analysis. First, the liberalization of agriculture and food markets is unlikely to have large effects on global poverty. Our results show that the incidence of extreme poverty (US1 per day, PPP) could rise by 0.2 percent, while moderate poverty (US2 per day, PPP) is likely to fall by 0.3 percent. The second message is that these small aggregate changes are produced by a combination of offsetting trends at the regional and country levels. Thus, farmers in Latin America-the region that accounts for less than 5 percent of global poverty-experience significant income gains, while almost 15 million agriculture producers in South Asia-where half of the world's poor reside-fall below the extreme poverty line. Third, the distributional changes due to agricultural trade reform are also likely to be mild, but exhibit a strong regional pattern. Inequality is likely to fall in regions such as Latin America, which are characterized by high initial inequality, and rise in regions like South Asia, characterized by low initial inequality.
There are several important caveats to our analysis. First, it should be emphasized that, although poverty reduction is a most worthy goal, it should not be the only, or even the first, metric with which to measure trade policy. Trade reform cannot be expected to benefit all constituents, and can only do so in the presence of other complimentary policies. Second, our analysis is confined to examination of the effects of static efficiency gains only, and does not consider the potential growth effects of trade liberalization. Although our results show that the static gains from agriculture trade reform may not contribute to reduction in extreme poverty and may do little to combat moderate poverty, they do not imply that this pattern of trade liberalization cannot be an effective tool for poverty reduction. Finally, our micro model considers only changes in labor income: while this is the most important income source for households at or near the poverty line, accounting for changes in other factor returns may yield results of a different magnitude. 
Appendix A: Changes in Moderate Poverty
